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PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING
Christian RojAst

This study utilizes a brand-level dataset that captures a uniq
experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate d
pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plaus
different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting fro
increase is exploited: observed prices in the post-increase p
compared to the prices that should be observed under variou
models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand-Nash, l
and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusi
confidently ruled out while several models may explain th
prices equally well.

I. INTRODUCTION

Economists have devoted considerable effort to the issue of identifying

firms' pricing conduct when marginal cost data is unobserved. In
homogeneous product markets, the typical approach is to estimate a
conduct parameter that can lie in a continuum between competition and

collusion (Bresnahan [1989]). Identification of conduct parameters in

markets with many differentiated products, however, is difficult because
the required product-level data is unlikely to exist (Nevo [1998]).1
The common approach used to study pricing conduct in differentiated
products has been to consider a menu of plausible models of pricing conduct
and rank them according to how well they fit the observed data. Measuring
the fit of each model takes various forms. One alternative is to estimate
directly different supply functions, one for each of the competing models,
and construct pair-wise tests such as non-nested statistics (e.g., Gasmi,
Laffont and Voung [1992]; Villas-Boas [2007]). This alternative is attractive
T am indebted to Catherine Eckel for her encouragement, support and constructive comments.
I thank Everett Peterson for his collaboration in related work and Victor Tremblay for his help
ful comments. The Editor and two referees provided suggestions that have substantially improved
this paper. I also thank Ronald Cotterill, Director of the Food Marketing Policy Research Center

at the University of Connecticut for making IRI and LNA data available. Research and travel
grants from the Department of Economics at Virginia Tech are acknowledged.

f Author's affiliation: Department of Resource Economics, 219 Stockbridge Hall,

University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003, U.S.A.
e-mail: rojas(a resecon.umass.edu

1 In addition, there has been criticism on the conduct parameter approach at the theoretical

and empirical level (e.g., Corts [1999]).

4' 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
Economics. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road. Oxford OX4 2DQ. UK, and 350 Main Street. Maiden. MA

02148, USA.
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2 christian rojas
because of the straightforward interpretation of results, but supply needs to
be modeled directly and it is often difficult to obtain rich enough and reliable
supply data at the product level. In addition, with a large number of products

and many competing models, constructing non-nested tests is a non-trivial

task.

A second alternative is to use demand estimates to compute the price-cost
margins implied by the competing models and compare them to observed
price-cost margins (Nevo [2001]; Slade [2004]). A potential problem of this
approach is that the crude measures of observed price-cost margins (i.e.,
average price-cost margins across products) that are available may yield
unreliable inference.

This paper employs an alternative approach to evaluate pricing conduct
by exploiting a unique natural experiment. In 1991, the excise tax on beer in
the U.S. was doubled, effectively increasing the marginal cost of all domestic

and imported beers. This study uses a brand-level dataset that captures both
pre- and post-increase periods. Briefly put, the large increase in marginal
cost is used to compute the 'predicted' prices that each of the competing
models would yield when the tax is introduced. Model comparisons are then
based on metrics that quantify the closeness of each model's predicted prices
to the 'observed' prices in the post-increase period.
Previous research has used the excise tax rate to analyze firm conduct in
the context of a homogeneous product model. Sumner [1981] and Sullivan
[1985] exploit the state and time variation of the cigarette excise tax to
identify the degree of competition in the industry. Sumner estimates the
average pass-through rate of the excise tax and relates it to the average firm

elasticity and its implied pricing conduct; Sumner concludes that the

estimated average elasticity is consistent with competitive conduct. Sullivan

employs a more flexible strategy and reaches a similar conclusion. Data
limitations do not allow these authors to investigate the issue at the firm or
product level, which is important because the strategic behavior among
firms is a key factor in the pass-through rate of excise taxes (Anderson, de

Palma and Kreider [2001]).
Studying firm conduct in the U.S. brewing industry is an interesting
question in its own right. U.S. brewing has experienced a dramatic change
from a fragmented industry to a highly concentrated oligopoly. The number
of mass-producing brewers has declined from 350 in 1950 to 24 in 2000 with a

corresponding increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index from 204 to
3,612 (Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]), making this industry one of the most

concentrated in the U.S.2

2 For comparison with other highly concentrated industries, the HHFs for cigarettes,
breakfast cereals and automobiles are 3,100, 2,446 and 2,506, respectively. The average index
for all manufacturing industries is 91 (U.S. Census Bureau, [1997] concentration ratios).
'? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ?} 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial

Economics.

This content downloaded from 128.119.169.6 on Mon, 27 Feb 2017 20:43:51 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING 3

This rising concentration has often raised concerns about market power

and non-cooperative behavior (Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]). In
addition, Greer [1998] and Tremblay and Tremblay [2005], and references
therein) identify Anheuser-Busch as a price leader especially through its
heavily marketed brand Budweiser. Evidence supports the fact that by the
1990's, Anheuser-Busch had become the clear price leader (Tremblay and
Tremblay [2005]: 171; Greer: 49-51).3
Earlier studies (Tremblay and Tremblay [1995] and [2005]) have found
that the degree of market power in U.S. brewing is low; however, their
analysis is limited to firm-level data. This limitation is particularly relevant
in the U.S. brewing market where product differentiation is important and
can give rise to prices above marginal costs even when deviations from
competitive pricing (Bertrand-Nash) are non-existent.
Brand-level studies in other industries (e.g., Nevo [2001]; Slade [2004])

have considered Bertrand-Nash and collusion as the alternative

modes of competition; this paper entertains two types of leadership

models in addition to Bertrand-Nash and collusion.4 Both leader
ship models are intended to reflect and formally test the forms of leadership
reported in this industry. The first model is called 'collusive price leadership'

in which followers match Budweiser's price changes. The second model is
Stackelberg with two variants. In one variant, Budweiser acts as the price
leader while in the other variant Anheuser-Busch leads other brands with its

entire product line. As an additional reference, the hypothetical case of
Bertrand-Nash with single-product firms (which can be thought of as the
portion of mark-up due to product differentiation alone)5 is compared to the
other models.
The dataset is comprised of brand-level prices and quantities collected by
scanning devices in 58 major metropolitan areas of the United States over a
period of 20 quarters (1988-1992). The empirical strategy consists of four
stages. First, a structural demand model for 64 brands is estimated. The

demand model is based on the neoclassical 'representative consumer'
approach rather than on the, more popular, 'discrete choice' approach. The
discrete choice assumption seems appropriate for products like automo
biles, but it appears less natural for beer. The major challenge of estimating

3 An anecdotal example that supports this view is the statement by Robert Uihlein,

Chairman of the Schlitz Brewery: 'A price increase is needed, but it will take Anheuser-Busch to

do it.' (Fortune [November, 1975, p. 92])
4 Two exceptions are Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta [1996], and Gasmi, Laffont and

Vuong who consider price leadership as an alternative mode of competition. These applications
are limited to the Stackelberg model and a small number of products (4 and 2, respectively).
5 The other portion of mark-ups for multi-product Bertrand-Nash competitors is due to
concentration (or fewness of multi-product firms) and is equal to the difference between the

mark-ups given by multi-product and single-product Bertrand-Nash competition (Nevo
[2001]).
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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numerous substitution coefficients is dealt with by the Distance Metric
(DM) method devised by Pinkse, Slade and Brett [2002]. This paper extends

previous applications of the DM method (Pinkse and Slade [2004]; Slade
[2004]) by also estimating advertising substitution patterns.6
In a second stage, the demand estimates are used to compute the marginal
costs implied by each of the competing models during the period prior to the

tax increase. The new marginal costs (pre-increase marginal costs plus the
tax increase) are then used to find the new equilibrium, or predicted, prices
that should be observed under each model when the tax is increased. Finally,

the predicted prices are compared to the actual prices to study which model
appears to be better supported by the data.

Results clearly rule out full collusion among all firms and the case

of collusive price leadership. Some evidence indicates that both Stackelberg
models may be better predictors of firm behavior. However, the prices
predicted by Bertrand-Nash, Stackelberg leadership, and collusion among
selected brands and firms, are not largely dissimilar. A discussion of these
findings and their relation to previous work is presented in the conclusion.

II. THE INDUSTRY AND THE TAX INCREASE

Commercial brewing began during the colonial period. By 1810 there were
132 breweries producing 185,000 barrels of mainly English and Irish-type
(ale, porter and stout) malt beverages. Lager beer was introduced in the mid
nineteenth century and today it accounts for over 90 per cent of the U.S.
brewing industry's output.7 Overall, total demand for beer in the U.S. has
been constantly increasing since the mid-twentieth century. Between 1960
and 1980 strong consumption growth was observed, but for the last three,
decades demand for beer has remained stagnant (180-210 million barrels per

year). Per capita consumption has fluctuated but has stabilized at

approximately 22 gallons per year.
Currently, the advertising-to-sales ratio for beer is 8.7 per cent compared

to 2.9 per cent for cigarettes, and 7.1 per cent for other beverages
(Advertising Age [2000]; cited in Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]). National

brewers have taken advantage of the more cost-effective marketing channel:

national TV. Larger national producers have driven many regional
producers out of business partly because of this marketing disadvantage
but also because of technological changes that required larger plants to
achieve a minimum efficient scale (MES).
6 Incorporating advertising into the demand system helps improve the validity of the price
instruments (see section V(i)).
7 A commonly used classification for beers sorts them into lagers and ales. Lagers are brewed
with yeasts that ferment at the bottom of the fermenting tank. Ales are brewed with yeasts
fermenting at high temperatures and at the top of the fermenting tank. Porter and Irish are
darker and sweeter than ale, with minimal market share in the United States today.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ?, 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Figure 1
Market shares of largest brewers in the U.S.
Source: Greer (1998), Beer Marketer's Insights.
Note: Stroh exited the market in 1999. The 2003 number corresponds to Pabst's market share (the
acquirer of some of Stroh's brands).

In 2003, nearly 80% of beer sales in the U.S. was concentrated among
three firms: Anheuser-Busch (49.8%), SABMiller (17.8%) (formerly Miller
and owned by Philip Morris) and Coors (10.7%). Anheuser-Busch has been
the largest beer producer since 1960, with an ever increasing market share
(Figure 1). Budweiser and Bud Light, Anheuser-Busch's two leading brands,
currently capture approximately one third of beer sales nationwide.
The industry is characterized by numerous product introductions and,
consequently, a large number of brands. An interesting fact is the increasing

popularity of light beer. Since the successful introduction of Miller Lite in
the 1970's, light beers have become the most popular beer type and now
account for almost half the sales of beer in the U.S.
While imports and specialty beers have increased their combined market

share from less than 1% in the 1970's to approximately 12% and 3%,
respectively, their impact in the industry as a whole remains limited. The
reason is that imports and specialty beers tend to compete less directly with
traditional mass-producers since they target different types of consumers.
U.S. brewing remains as one of the most interesting industries because of
its ramifications to other important issues such as health, taxation and
regulation. Tremblay and Tremblay [2005] present the most comprehensive
economic analysis of this industry to date.

The Federal Excise Tax Increase
In 1990, U.S. Congress approved an increase in the federal excise tax on
beer from $9 to $18 per barrel. All brewers and importers were required to
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial

Economics.
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Figure 2
Quarterly mean prices, various beer segments (1988-1992)
Source: IRI Database, University of Connecticut

pay this tax on all produced units as of January, 1991. This increase, which
was equivalent to an additional 64 cents in federal taxes per 288 ounces (a 24
pack), represented the largest federal tax hike for beer in U.S. history.

Figure 2 shows mean quarterly prices (over all cities) for three beer

segments using the data set available for this paper. There is a clear shift in
the mean price of all three categories in the first quarter of 1991. All mean
increases are higher than the actual tax hike of 64 cents per 288 ounces: 220
cents for imports, 140 cents for super-premium beers and 120 cents for

budget beers. These mean increases were 237%, 114%, and 84%,

respectively, larger than the tax increase of 64 cents per case. This is

consistent with the theoretical findings of Anderson, de Palma and Kreider
who show that in oligopolies with differentiated products, an excise tax can
be passed on to consumers by more than 100%.

III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Comparison of different pricing models is carried out by exploiting the
exogenous variation of an increase in the federal excise tax. Since all pricing
models require estimates of own-price and cross-price elasticities, the first
step is to estimate the demand for beer at the brand-level. With these
estimates, the implied marginal costs of all brands are computed for each of
the models. This computation is carried out in each quarter that preceded the

tax increase. Using each brand's median marginal cost (over the pre-tax
increase period), the demand elasticity estimates, the pre-tax-increase values
of the remaining variables, and the increase in marginal cost due to the tax
increase, the post-tax increase equilibrium prices are computed for each
pricing model. These predicted price increases are then compared to the
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial

Economics.
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actual price increases. This section provides details on demand, supply and
the computation of marginal costs. Sections V(ii) and V(iii) present details
on the computation of equilibrium prices and actual prices increases.

III(i). Demand
Let v|/ = {1,...,/} be the product set, 3 = {1,..., T} the set of markets (in
this study a market is defined as a city-quarter pair), qt = {qUi..., qJt] the
vector of quantities demanded, pt = {pu,.. .,pjt} the corresponding price
vector and xt = J2jPjtajt total expenditures. The linear approximation to the
Almost Ideal Demand System (LALIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer is used
due its desirable theoretical properties:

(1) wjt = a* + Y^k bJk l??Pkt + dj \og(xt/Pt)
where Wjt = /~^L is brand fs sales share and log Pt is a price index
approximated the loglinear analogue of the Laspeyeres index:8

(2) log i>,? 5^ logfo,)
where w? is brand fs 'base' share, defined as w? = T~l J2t Wjt.9
Traditional advertising (e.g. television, radio and press) is considered the
key advertising variable because of its crucial role in the development of the
industry. Further, only the flow effects of advertising are considered with all

lagged own- and cross-advertising terms being omitted for the demand

equation.10
Advertising for brand k (Ak) is incorporated into equation (1) by defining

the intercept term as: a*t = ajt -f Ylk ci^kv ^e Parameter y is included to
account for decreasing returns to advertising. Following Gasmi, Laffont
and Voung, y is set equal to 0.5. Substituting the redefined intercept into
equation (1) and including an econometric error term gives:

(3) Wjt = ajt + ]T/c cjkA\t + Y2k bjk logpkt + dj \og(xt/Pt) + ejt
Equation (3) is as a first-order approximation in prices and advertising to

a demand function that allows unrestricted price and advertising
parameters. In order to reduce the number of cross-price and cross
advertising coefficients that need to be estimated, the Distance Metric (DM)
method of Pinkse, Slade and Brett is employed. This method specifies each
8 Moschini [1995] explains how this price index can have superior approximating properties

than the Stone price index of Deaton and Muellbauer.
9 The 'fixed' base w? moderates the problem of having an additional endogenous variable
on the right hand side of (1).
10 The existence of possible stock effects was investigated but the estimated coefficients on
lagged advertising expenditures were found not to be statistically different from zero.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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8 CHRISTIAN ROJAS
cross-coefficient (bjk and cjk) as a function of the distance between brands
j and k in product space.
Distance measures may be either continuous or discrete. For example,
alcohol content can be used to construct a continuous distance measure.

Dichotomous variables that group brands into different market segments
are used to construct discrete distance measures and take a value of 1 if
brands j and k belong to the same grouping and zero otherwise. Continuous
distance measures use an inverse measure of distance (closeness) between

brands.

The terms bjk and cjk are specified as a linear combination of distance

measures:

(4) &,* =r=l X>^
(5) CJk = J2?sPfk
s=\
where 8Jk = {djk, ..., 8fk] is the set of distance measures for cross-prices and
pjk = {pjk, ..., pjk} the set of measures for cross-advertising; X and t are the
coefficients to be estimated.11 After replacing (4) and (5) into (3) and
regrouping terms gives the empirical demand equation:

wjt =ajt + bjj \ogpjt + CjjA'jt + Y^=l ( K J2k 5)k lo%Pkt) +

(6) s ( \

+ 5Z,=i (Ts Ylk VjkAk) + dJ Xo^xtlpt) + ejt

The estimated coefficients kr and xs and the distance measures between
brands {5jk and pjk) are replaced into (4) and (5) to obtain cross-terms {bjk
and Cjk). Since distance measures are symmetric by definition, and to reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated, symmetry (i.e., bjk = bkj and
cjk = ckJ) is imposed by setting / and t to be equal across equations.

In principle, (/?1) seemingly unrelated equations can be estimated.

However, since J is very large, it becomes impractical to estimate such a large

system. Alternatively, it is assumed that the own-price and own-advertising
coefficients (bjj and CjJ), and the price index coefficient (d7), are equal across

equations thereby reducing estimation to one equation (since symmetry is

also imposed). Since this is too strong of an assumption, and following
1 [ Various specifications of the semi-parametric estimator proposed by Pinkse, Slade and
Brett were implemented to check that the parametric specification of h and g in (4) and (5) is not

a restrictive functional form. See Rojas [2005].

? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Pinkse and Slade, the coefficients blh cjh and dj are specified as linear
functions of brandy's characteristics.

Because of the large price increase in prices of all beers as a result of the tax
increase, it is important to allow the budget share allocations xt to change as

the overall price of beer changes. This can be done by using a two-stage
budgeting approach, where the bottom level of brand-level demand is given

by (6) and the top-level demand for beer is modeled as (see Hausman,
Leonard and Zona [1994]):

(7) log qt = P0 + Pi log Yt + p2 log II, + Ztqb + e,
where Yt is income, J\ , is a deflated price index for beer, Zt is a vector of city
and time- and city-specific dummies, and /} = (j80, P\, Pi) and <j> are vectors of

parameters to be estimated. The main parameter of interest is p2 because it
measures the sensitivity of demand for 'all' beer to changes in the overall
price of beer. Since xt in (6) is a function of (7), unconditional elasticities and

price derivatives can then be obtained by applying the chain rule to (6).

Continuous Distance Measures
The characteristics utilized are alcohol content (ALC), product coverage
(COV), and container size (SIZE). Product coverage measures the fraction
of the city in which a brand is present and is defined as the all commodity
value (ACV) of stores carrying the product divided by the ACV of all stores
in that city. Beers with low coverage may be interpreted as specialty brands

that are targeted to a particular segment of the population.12 Beer is sold in a
variety of sizes (e.g., six and twelve packs), and the variable SIZE measures
the average 'package size' of a brand. Higher volume brands (e.g., typical
sales of twelve packs and cases) may compete less strongly with brands that
are sold in smaller packages (e.g., six packs).
The characteristics of a brand determine its location in product space.
Using these locations, inverse measures of distance (closeness) in one- and
two-dimensional Euclidean spaces are computed for all pairs of brands.13

Discrete Distance Measures
Three different types of discrete distance measures are utilized. The first
type focuses on various product groupings including product segment,
12 For example, Miller Genuine Draft is in virtually all retail outlets of all cities whereas
the imported Labatt's Blue is only present, on average, in 45% of a city's supermarkets.
13 The inverse measure of distance between brands/ and k is defined as: 1/[1 + 2(Euclidean

distance between j and k)]. Euclidean distance in one-dimensional space is the absolute

difference in the value of the characteristic between/'and k. In /7-dimensional space, Euclidean

distance is equal to J2n (/? ? k?)~ < where the subscript is the brand's coordinate in each of
the n dimensions.
<; 2008 The Author. Journal compilation < 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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10 CHRISTIAN ROJAS
brewer identity, and national brand identity. With no clear consensus on
product segment classifications, five different classifications are considered:

(1) budget, light, premium, super-premium, and imports, (2) light and
regular, (3) budget, light, and premium, (4) domestic and import, and (5)
budget, premium, super-premium, and imports. Because brand competition
may be stronger across brands from different brewers, a discrete measure is
constructed to identify all brands by the same brewer. Similarly, brands that

are national (regional) may compete more strongly with one another so a
discrete distance measure that groups brands by whether they are national or

regional is created.
Following PSB, two other types of discrete measures are constructed

based on the nearest neighbor concept and whether products share a
common boundary in product space. Brands j and k share a common
boundary if there is a set of consumers that would be indifferent between
both brands and prefer these two brands over any other brand in product
space. The nearest neighbor and common boundary measures are computed
for all pairs brands based on their location in alcohol content and coverage

space, and coverage and container size space. A second set of nearest
neighbor and common boundary measures are computed using both

product characteristics and price thereby allowing consumers' brand choices
to be influenced not only by distance in characteristics space but also by price

(see Rojas for details).
Own-Price and Own-Advertising Interactions

Two product characteristics are interacted with own-price and own
advertising in the model:14 the inverse of product coverage (l/COV) and the
number of common boundary neighbors (NCB). The number of common
boundary neighbors is a measure of local competition that determines the
number of competitors that are closely located to a brand in product space.

NCB is computed in product coverage-container size space and alcohol
content-coverage space.

Ill(ii). Supply
Let Fn be the set of brands produced by firm n. Assuming constant marginal

costs and linear additivity of advertising, the profit of firm n in a given
market is expressed as:

(8) *n = J2 (Pj ~ Cj)qj(p, A)~Y1 AJ
jeFn jefn

14 These were the interactions that y
specifications.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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where cy is brand fs marginal cost, pj is its price and Aj is firm rts advertising

expenditures on brand/ Firm rc's first order conditions can be expressed as:

(9) qj(p,A) + ^(pk-ck)^= Q, with respect to/?/
keF? ?pJ

(10) ^(pk-Ck)^-l=
0, with respect to Aj
keF? 0AJ

where |r=s^+ m?Fn
E |^^r- Partial derivatives in (9) and (10) are the
unconditional price derivatives obtained from demand estimates for
equations (6) and (7). The term &%. in ?& however, takes different values
depending on the model of interest; this term is the 'conjecture' of firm n
about how the price of product m will react to a change in the price of

product j.
In principle, several games in advertising can also be considered.

However, simulations of collusion, Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg games

in advertising produced equilibrium conditions that were essentially
indistinguishable from each other; the reason is the small magnitude of
advertising coefficients obtained from demand estimation. Consequently,
price is treated as the main strategic variable of interest and it is assumed that

firms compete in a Bertrand-Nash fashion in advertising.

Bertrand-Nash and Collusion
For Bertrand-Nash competition in prices, the conjecture takes a value of
zero. The conjecture is also zero in the of single-product Bertrand-Nash
competition and in the case of collusion, but the ownership sets (Fn) are
modified to reflect the profit-maximizing conditions of single-product firms

(i.e., F?s are singletons) and colluding firms (i.e. joint profit-maximization),
respectively.

Stackelberg Leadership
Two cases are considered, one in which Budweiser leads brands produced
by firms other than Anheuser-Busch and the other in which Anheuser-Busch

leads with its entire product line. For this game, the conjecture term (^pM
takes a value of zero if j is a follower brand. If j is a leading brand, the
conjecture term is computed from the first order conditions of followers by

applying the implicit function theorem. Appendix A contains details of this

procedure.

i 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Collusive Price Leadership
In this case followers exactly match Budweiser's price changes. In this
'collusive price leadership' scenario only the first order conditions of the firm

producing the leading brand (i.e., Anheuser-Busch) are relevant, since
followers do not price via profit-maximization but by imitating the leader.

The term ^ in (9) is set to 1 in Budweiser's first order condition and to zero
in Anheuser-Busch's remaining first order conditions.15

Ill(iii). Marginal Costs
In each market, there are two equations for each unknown marginal cost (cj).

After adding up (9) and (10) for each brandy, a solution for Cj is obtained in
this new system.16 The system in vector notation is:

(ii) eo-A(?-c) = o
where Q? and (p ? c) are J x 1 vectors with elements (gj (p,A)-l) and

(Pj ? Cj), respectively; A is a J x J matrix with typical element

AJk = -Ayfrf|^ + ?2JH, where A*k takes a value of 1 if brands j and k are
produced by same firm and zero otherwise. Applying simple inversion to A in

(11) gives the implied marginal costs:

(12) c = p-A-1Q?
Marginal costs in each market are computed using the demand estimates

and the appropriate values of the conjectures l-j^j for each of the models.
Collusive possibilities (e.g., between specific products or firms) are
investigated by appropriately modifying the elements Al (which determine

the ownership sets Fn). For example, full collusion, or joint profit
maximization, is equivalent to setting all At elements to equal one.

Appendix A provides details on the computation of marginal costs for the
leadership models.
IV. DATA

Table I provides a description and summary statistics of the variable used
The main source is the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan Databas
The IRI data includes prices and total sales for several hundred brands f

15 Appendix A contains details of computational problems (and the solutions adopted) th
arise in both types of leadership models (Stackelberg and Collusive).

16 Since this is a linear problem, the solution is unique. Moreover, if cf is the same in both (
and (10) (which it is by assumption) the solution will solve (9) and (10) individually. If, on t
other hand, two different cfs solve (9) and (10), the solution of the added system will be a linea
combination of the two cfs.

c 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industri
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Table I

Data Description Summary of Statistics

Variable Description Units Mean St dev Min Max
Price Average Price per brand $/288oz 12.1 3.87 0.82 28.9
Quantity Volume Sold 288 oz 23.53 63.6 0.00 2652

SIZE Quantity/Units Units = #of units sold, all sizes N/A 0.38 0.117

Coverage Sum of all commodity value (ACV) sold by % 74.0 28
(COV) stores carrying the product/ACV of all stores
in the city

OVER50K % of Households with income over % 23.3 6.1 10.3 44.8
$50,000/year

A Quarterly national advertising expenditures Mill of $ 3.54 6.3 0 40

ALC Alcohol Content %/vol 4.48 0.94 0.4 5.25
R 1 if brand is regional, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.15

WAGES Average wage of worker in retail sector S/hour 7.3 1

DEN Population per square mile (000) 4.73 4.13 0.73 23.7
INCOME Median Income (000) of $ 32.02 6.9 18.1 53.4

Source: IRI database, University of Connecticut; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Demographia; other

up to 58 cities over 20 quarters (1988-1992).17 Volume sales (Qua

each city are reported as the number of 288-ounce units sold each qua
all supermarkets in that city and price is an average price for a volum

oz. for each brand. To maintain focus on brands with significan
share, all brands with a local market share of less than 3% are exc

the sample. This selection criterion provides a sample of 6

produced by 13 different brewers. Appendix B contains a table
brands chosen as well as other details of the database and the dat

procedure.
In addition to price and sales data, IRI has information on other
brand specific and market variables. Because beer is sold in a variety
of sizes (e.g., six and twelve packs), the variable UNITS provides the
number of units, regardless of size, sold each quarter. An average
size variable is created: SIZE = Quantity/UNITS. The variable COV
measures the degree of city coverage for each brand. Lastly, the
variable OVER50AT, which is the fraction of households that have an
income above $50,000 in each city-quarter pair, was also included in the
estimation.
Advertising data (A) was obtained from the Leading National Advertis
ing annual publication. These are quarterly data by brand comprising total

national advertising expenditures for 10 media types. Alcohol content
(ALC) was collected from various specialized sources.

Data for demand side instruments were collected from additional
sources. A proxy for supermarkets labor cost (WAGES) is constructed
17 The actual market definitions of these cities are broader than a single city and are usually
referred to as 'metropolitan areas.' The term city here is used for simplicity. In general, the
definition of these metropolitan areas is broader than the BLS definitions.
Z 2008 The Author. Journal compilation < 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal oflndustrial

Economics.

This content downloaded from 128.119.169.6 on Mon, 27 Feb 2017 20:43:51 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

14 CHRISTIAN ROJAS

from data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS monthly earning
files. City density estimates (DEN), collected from Demographia and the

Bureau of Labor Statistics, were included to proxy for cost of shelf
space. INCOME from the IRI database was used to instrument for
expenditures (xt).
V. ESTIMATION

V(i). Demand and Instruments

Because firms are assumed to choose both price and advertising, these
variables are treated as endogenous variables. To avoid simultaneity bias, an
instrumental variables approach is used to consistently estimate both brand
level demand (6) and top-level demand (7).

Brand-level Demand

Let nz be the number of instruments, Z the (T x J) x nz matrix of
instruments, S the collection of right hand side variables in equation (6), 6
the vector of parameters to be estimated and w sales shares in vector form.

The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator Ogmm ?

(S'PzS)~lS'Pzw is employed. The consistent estimator for its asymptotic
variance is defined as Av2lx(6GMm) = (SfPzS)~\ where Pz = Z(Z'QZ')_1Z
and Q is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element equal to the squared

residual obtained from a 'first step' 2SLS regression.
As in previous work, the instruments employed in this paper rely on the
identification assumption that, after controlling for brand, city, and time
specific effects, demand shocks are independent across cities. Because beer is
produced in large plants and distributed to various states, the prices of a brand

across different cities share a common marginal cost component, implying
that prices of a given brand are correlated across markets. If the identifying
assumption is true, prices will not be correlated with demand shocks in other
markets and can hence be used as instruments for other markets. In particular,
the average price of a brand in other cities is used as its instrument.

The data employed in this study are based on broadly defined markets.
These broad market definitions, which are similar to those used by the Bureau

of Labor Statistics, reduce the possibility of potential correlation between the
unobserved shocks across markets. Furthermore, demand shocks that may be

correlated across markets because of broad advertising strategies are

controlled for by including national advertising expenditures in the demand
equation. To further control of other potential unobserved national shocks,
time dummies are included in the estimation.

Because advertising expenditures are only observed at the national level
each quarter, lagged advertising expenditures are used as its instrument.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Expenditures (xt), which is constructed with price and quantity variables, is
also treated as endogenous and is instrumented with median income.

A final identification assumption, which is common practice in the

literature, is that product characteristics are assumed to be mean independent

of the error term. The validity of the proposed instruments is assessed by
conducting a formal test. Additional instruments for price are created from
city-specific marginal costs (i.e., proxies for shelf space and transportation
costs, see Nevo, [2001]) and an overidentifying restrictions test is used to check
the validity of instruments.

As observed by Berry [1994], an additional source of endogeneity may be
present in differentiated products industries. Unobserved product character
istics (included in the error term), which can be interpreted as product quality,
style, durability, status, or brand valuation, may be correlated with price and

advertising and produce biases in the estimated coefficients. This source of
endogeneity is controlled for with the inclusion of brand-specific fixed effects

(Nevo [2001]). These fixed effects control for the unobserved product
characteristics that are invariant across markets, reducing the bias and
improving the fit of the model.

Top-level Demand

Equation (7) is estimated with two-stage least squares where the
instruments are cost shifters: ingredients, packaging, city density (to proxy

for shelf space) and labor cost (supermarket and industry).

V(ii). Predicted Prices with Higher Excise Taxes
Marginal costs (12) for the pre-tax-increase period are used to compute each
model's predicted equilibrium prices after the tax change (i.e., the first
quarter of 1991). Since excise taxes were increased for all beers at a uniform
rate of E per unit, predicted prices in each city for quarter y + 1 are computed

by solving for py+ x (j = 1,..., J) in the following system of non-linear

equations:

<,(/+', Ay) - 1k?F?
+ ? (^' -t?Pj
4 - E) 0/ij]
g +1|| = 0, for;
= 1,..,/

where the superscript y denotes the quarter prior to the t

quarter of 1990.18 Because qj and all derivatives are functions of price (pj+l),
18 To avoid sensitivity to potential outliers in quarter^, the median city-specific marginal cost
of brand k over the period 1988-1990 is used for c?. Results, however, are qualitatively the same
if only marginal costs for the fourth quarter of 1990 are used.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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the search includes these non-linear terms. Other variables (i.e., advertising,
distance measures, product characteristics and total expenditures xf) are
held constant at time y values, while demand parameters are those obtained
from estimation. The predicted prices are computed for every brand in each
of the 46 cities for which data are available.19

Results are invariable to whether pre- or post-tax-increase advertising is
used in the search. In some cities, a few brands (1 or 2) exited or entered the
market between the fourth quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991. In
these cities, the search was performed for the subset of brands that were
present in both quarters. The potential bias of this simplification is likely to
be small as the ignored brands tend to be marginal in terms of sales.

V(iii). Estimates of Actual Price Increases
A straightforward way to compute an average estimate of the actual price
increase across cities (and its confidence interval) is to estimate a separate
regression for each brand of the following form (see Hausman and Leonard

[2002]):

(13) pyz = ez + r,'I + eyz
where pyz is price in quarter y and city z (i.e., each city-quarter pair y,z
corresponds to a market /), 9Z are city fixed effects, / is a vector of time

dummy variables (one for each of 19 quarters -one omitted to avoid

collinearity) and n its corresponding vector of coefficients. If the time
dummy on the fourth quarter of 1990 is omitted (i.e., this is the reference
quarter), the coefficient on the dummy for the first quarter of 1991 can be
interpreted as the absolute mean price increase for that brand due to the tax
increase (its standard error is used to construct confidence intervals). This
coefficient, however, captures the mean effect on price of all city-invariant
factors present in the first quarter of 1991 (i.e., other national shocks besides

the tax increase). A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the first
quarter of each year was included in (13) to control for a possible seasonality
effect.
VI. RESULTS

VI(i). Demand
This section presents the estimation results for brand-level demand (eq. 6)
and top-level demand (eq. 7).
19 This system is solved by using the iterative Newton algorithm for large-scale problems
provided by Matlab. Convergence is quickly achieved for the Bertrand-Nash and collusive
models, but leadership models require several hours of computing power.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Brand-level Demand

Because the functional form of demand constitutes only a local
approximation to any unknown demand function, demand parameters
can potentially differ between the two regimes (pre- and post-tax-increase).
However, aside from slightly larger standard errors, demand estimates with
pre-increase data produced results that were essentially the same as those
obtained with the full sample. Estimates are therefore robust to these two
sample sizes. Demand estimates reported in this section were computed with
the full sample.
The regressions below contain variables that consistently had the greatest
explanatory power in different specifications. Table (II) reports the GMM
regression results for two different models. The difference between models 1
and 2 is the inclusion of brand dummies. The two models contain time and city

binary variables (coefficients not reported).
In the intercept, there is only one product-specific variable that varies by
market: number of common boundaries in alcohol content-product coverage
space (NCBAQ. The negative coefficient on NCBAC shows that brands that
share a common boundary with more neighbors in alcohol content-coverage
space have a lower sales share.
The estimated coefficients for own-price, own-advertising, and their
interactions with product characteristics are reported in the second group
of variables in Table II. Because price and advertising are highly correlated
with their corresponding interactions with product coverage, the inverse of
this latter variable (1 /COV) is used to avoid collinearity. The own-price and
own-advertising coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 %

level and have the expected negative and positive signs. The negative
coefficients on the interaction of price and advertising with the inverse of
product coverage indicates that as the coverage of a brand increases, the own

price effect for that brand decreases (becomes less negative) while the own
advertising effect increases (becomes more positive). Thus, the sales of brands
that are widely sold within a city are less sensitive to a change in price than are

brands that are less widely available. Also, advertising is more effective for

brands that are more widely sold. Finally, as the number of common

boundaries increases, the own-price effect increases (becomes more negative)
and the own-advertising effect decreases. This shows that higher brand

competition is associated with more price responsive demand and less
effective advertising.

Comparing models 1 and 2, the estimated own-price coefficient is nearly

twice as large in absolute terms when brand dummies are included.

Conversely, the own-advertising coefficient decreased by approximately
80 per cent in model 2. The better goodness-of-fit of model 2 and the
magnitude of change on both price and advertising coefficients highlight the
importance of accounting for endogeneity, resulting from unobserved
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Table II

Results of GMM Estimation of Demand Model*

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SALES SHARE (w/r) _Model 1 Model 2

Variable; Description Coeff. (7-stat)** Coeff. (?-stat)**
Constant ajt

Brand Dummies no no yes yes
NCBAC = # common boundary -1.15 (-0.85) -3.91 (-3.66)

neighbors, Alcohol content - Coverage space

OVER50K -94.84 (-0.57) -240.0 (-1.90)

Own Price (b) and Own-Advertising (c)

"TogP -122.40 (-9.82) - 252.90 (-5.71)

logP' x (1/COV) -0.56 (-2.38) -1.09 (-3.46)

logP' x NCBCSP; NCBCSP = # CB neighbors -4.82 (-7.2

Coverage-Size-Price space

Ay 8.48 (31.15) 1.32 (4

A' x (1/COV) -0.68 (-5.58) -0.19 (

A' x NCBCS; NCBCS = #common boundary -1.65 ( ? 3
(CB) neighbors, Coverage-Size space

Weighted Cross Price and Weighted Cross-Advertising Terms (A/ and

Distance Measures for Price

Alcohol Content - Product Coverage, 2.10 (13.66)
two-dimensional product space

Nearest neighbors in Alcohol Content - Product -0.21 (Coverage space

Brewer identity -12.18 (-5.38) 17.30 (5.31)
Product classification 2: Regular - light 52.39 (
National Identity 40.83 (5.85) 49.61 (5.39)
Distance Measures for Advertising

Container Size, one-dimensional product space 0.1
Common boundary in product coverage - 0.85 (15

container size - price space

Nearest neighbors in product coverage - container 0.61

size space
Product Classification 3: Budget, light, and premium - 2.78 (- 14.58) - 3.22 (- 9.10)

National Identity -3.02 (-21.79) 5.30 (2.65)
Price Index (d)

\og(xt/Pf) 2815 (T08) 273

R2 (centered, uncentered) 0.40,0.58 0.66,0.76

/-Statistic (p-value) 0.90 0.50

*Note: Based on 33,892 observations. Coefficients in table are original coefficie
include, time and city dummies (not reported).
**Asymptotic /-statistics.

product characteristics, with the inclusion of brand du

the overidentification test in model 2 (p-value = 0.50) sugg
of instruments is valid.

In model 2, the estimated coefficients on the weighted c

all positive. Thus, brands that are closer in the alcoho
coverage space (both in terms of Euclidean distance an
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produced by the same brewer, belong to the same product segment, or have
similar geographic coverage, are stronger substitutes than other brands.
Intuitively, consumers will more likely switch to a brand located nearby in
product space and/or produced by the same brewer than to more distant
brands. Based on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, the strongest
substitution effects are for brands in the same product segment and with
similar geographic coverage.
With the exception of product segment, the estimated coefficients on
weighted cross-advertising terms are positive. This suggests the existence of
cooperative effects across brands that are more closely located in product

space and with the same geographic coverage. However, the negative
coefficient for product segment indicates that there are predatory advertising
effects for brands in the same product segment, thereby potentially offsetting
some of the cooperative effects.
The estimated coefficient on real expenditures, \og(xt/Pt), is not statistically

different from zero. Several attempts to interact product or market
characteristics with real expenditures yielded statistically insignificant
coefficients. This result implies that the brand-level budget elasticities are
not statistically different from one.

Top-level Demand
Various sets of instrumental variables and specifications failed to produce
statistically significant estimates of the overall price elasticity of beer, p2 in

equation (7). This is a somewhat unlikely result, as prior research has
typically found a statistically significant price elasticity for beer. Evidence of

this are the troublesome unconditional (brand-level) price elasticities
obtained with this estimate of p2: it is not uncommon to see own-price
elasticities that are less than one in absolute value, which typically imply
(unfeasible) price-cost margins of over 100%.
Hausman, Leonard and Zona suggest that the use of longer time series can
produce more plausible estimates of the overall price elasticity of beer. The
data used in this study appear to be contemporaneous to that of Hausman,
Leonard and Zona, who use 16 years of data and instrumental variables
(similar to those proposed here) to estimate an overall price elasticity for

beer of ?1.36 (s.e.: 0.21). This is the estimate employed to compute

unconditional elasticities and price derivatives.

Elasticities
Unconditional elasticities were computed in each city-quarter pair using
the estimates of ((6), model 2 above) and (7). All own-price elasticities are
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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negative and statistically significant, with a median of - 3.34.20 Cross-price
elasticities have a median value of 0.050 with 92% of them being positive;
none of the negative cross-price elasticities is significant while 96% of the
positive cross-price elasticities is significant. In general, median own-price
elasticities are slightly smaller to those reported in Hausman, Leonard and
Zona (? 4.98), and Slade (? 4.1). Cross-price elasticities are similar to those
in Slade but an order of magnitude smaller than those reported by Hausman,

Leonard and Zona. A reason for the larger cross-price elasticities in
Hausman, Leonard and Zona is that a significantly smaller number of
brands are considered in their study; the magnitude of cross-price elasticities

needs to decrease as more brands are added, otherwise the elasticity matrix

would cease to be dominant diagonal.
Median own-advertising elasticity is 0.024 with approximately 85% of
them being positive. Cross-advertising elasticities have median of 0.021 with
88% of them being positive. However, not all advertising elasticities are

significant: 15% of all negative advertising elasticities and 14% of all
positive elasticities are not statistically significant. A sample of median price
and advertising elasticities and a further discussion are provided in Rojas

and Peterson [2008].

VI(ii). Implied Price-Cost Margins
For each model, implied marginal costs in the pre-tax-increase period are
calculated according to details in section Ill(iii). Summary statistics of marginal

costs can be informative about differences in the equilibrium predictions of
the models; however, price-cost margins are more readily interpretable. Pre
tax-increase summary statistics of price-cost margins (PCM) as a percentage
of price (100 x [p - c]/p) are presented in Table III. Seven different models
are considered: Bertrand-Nash; two Stackelberg scenarios: firm leadership

by Anheuser-Busch and brand leadership by Budweiser; collusive leadership
by Budweiser; and three collusive scenarios: collusion of the three leading
firms (Anheuser-Busch, Coors and Miller), collusion of the leading regular
brand produced by each of the three largest firms (Budweiser, Coors and
Miller Genuine Draft), and full collusion. In addition, the hypothetical case
of single-product Bertrand-Nash competition is also considered.

The mean PCMs in the two Stackelberg cases and in collusion among

three brands are very similar to that of Bertrand-Nash. Collusion among
three firms has slightly larger PCMs than Bertrand-Nash, and full collusion
has the largest PCMs (although there are several cases in which unfeasible

price-cost margins (over 100%) are detected). The PCMs under single

20 Signficance is determined with 95% confidence intervals (not shown), which were
computed using 5,000 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated demand
coefficients.
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Table III
Summary Statistics of Price Cost Margins for Different Models, (1988--1990)*
Model Mean Median St dev

Single-Product Bertrand-Nash 34.63 31.06 25.18
Bertrand-Nash 37.26 35.48 23.73

Anheuser-Busch Stackelberg Leadership

Budweiser Stackelberg Leadership 3
Collusive Leadership (Budweiser)** 5
Collusion 3 firms? 39.53 41.77 23.23

Collusion 3 brands ? 37.20 35.72 23.44
Full Collusion 68.01 69.78 11.64

*Margins are denned as 100 x (p ? c)/p. Based on 18,369 (brand

period (1988-1990).

**Price-cost margins obtained for Anheuser-Busch brands only

?Anheuser-Busch, Adolph Coors and Miller.
? Budweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft.

product Bertrand-Nash are lower but clo
Nash. This suggests that a large portion
multi-product Bertrand-Nash competitio

differentiation alone, while only a small r
concentration of brand ownership.
Since in the collusive price leadership scen

for Anheuser-Busch brands, summary statisti

comparable with those of other models. H
larger for Budweiser (mean 97% vs. 78% in
similar to Bertrand-Nash PCMs for other
47% in both collusive price leadership and
In all models, PCMs vary considerably acr
is directly related to the price elasticities and

and thus is plays an important role when co

power.

One way to identifiy models of competition is to compare implied PCMs

with observed PCMs. However, observed PCMs are unavailable. A raw
measure of PCM is the gross margin (total shipments minus labor and
materials) calculated from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (as in Nevo
[2001]). The average gross margin for the U.S. brewing industry in the pre
tax increase period (1988-1990) is 44.53% (27.5% for all food industries),
which is somewhat larger than what is predicted by the models, except for
collusive leadership and full collusion. The next section provides brand-level
closeness measures between the observed prices and the prices predicted by
the different models during the post-tax-increase period.

Vl(iii). Predicted vs. Actual Price Increases

Here absolute price increases h^+1 - Pj) are compared to estimates of
observed or 'actual' price increases (see sections V(ii) and V(iii)). A graphical

Z 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Rudweis T -?? Predicted Increase ($) -?-Actual Increase ($)*

Anheuser-Busch Coors Bond Corp Pabst Miller Stroh
I 3 5 7 10 12 14 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 56 58 60 62

Brand ID**
Figure 3
Predicted price increases by Bertrand-Nash behavior vs. actual price increases per brand after
100% hike in the federal excise tax (mean over 46 cities)
* Vertical Lines are 95% Confidence Intervals

**See Table V for Brand ID's

assessment of each brand's mean predicted price increase across cities
revealed that full collusion and collusive price leadership produce unlikely

high price increases (10 times or more the amount of the actual price
increase) whereas the remaining models (including single-product Bertrand
Nash) yield predicted increases that are not substantially different from each

other. For this reason, and because of space constraints, only predicted
increases of Bertrand-Nash (the baseline case) are presented graphically for
each brand. Figure 3 plots the means of the price increases as predicted by

Bertrand-Nash as well as the means of the actual price increases. Mean
predicted increases are averages across 46 cities while mean actual increases
are computed according to details in section V(iii). 95% confidence intervals
are displayed for the mean of actual price increases.21
There are several patterns in Figure 3. Price increases tend to be under
predicted (44 out of 63 brands).22 Also, over-predicted prices appear to be
more frequent among the two largest beer producers: Anheuser-Busch (7 out
of 10) and Miller (4 out of 7). This is because these two firms produce the

21 The non-linear systems for predicted price increases require several hours of computing
time. Calculating confidence intervals for predicted mean price increases with a bootstrapping
technique are hence extremely costly even with a modest number of draws.
22 A similar number of under-predictions are detected for the other models not shown in the
figure (except for full collusion and collusive price leadership in which all price increases are

over-predicted).
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Table IV
Summary Statistics of Actual and Predicted Price Increases, and
Performance Metrics of Models
Summary Statistics3 Performance Metrics
Mean Median St. Dev. # No-Rejectb Weighted Increase0 SSDd

Actual Increases 1.38 1.37 0.65 N/A 64.74 N/A

Predicted Increases

Single-Product Bertrand-Nash 0.95 0.81 1.07 20 89.74 3587
Bertrand-Nash 1.02 0.90 1.02 21 86.91 3643

A-B Stackelberg Leader6 1.00 0.92 0.98 21 7
Budweiser Stackelberg Leader 0.99 0.89 0.99 21
Collusion 3 firmsf 1.21 1.11 1.01 22 87.48 4328

Collusion 3 brands8 1.03 0.93 1.00 23 84.45 3621
Full Collusion 18.19 13.40 15.88 0 1014.95 > 1E6

"Computed with absolute price increases for each brand: the absolute price difference between

of 1991 and the fourth quarter of 1990, over 46 cities (1748 observations).

bN umber of brands for which mean of predicted increases falls within the confidence interva

increases (as in Figure 3).
cSum of weighted absolute price increases; weight = volume of brand sold in city total volume

cities in the first quarter of 1990 (1748 observations).

dSum of squared deviations over all brands and all cities; deviation = predicted-actual (174
eA-B = Anheuser-Busch.
fAnheuser-Busch. Adolph Coors, Miller (Philip Morris).
gBudweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft.

more price-inelastic brands and price elasticity is inversely as
higher tax pass-through rates. Many brands have tight 95%
intervals around actual mean increases (around 15 0 and 200)
that price increases do not vary substantially across cities. Th

particularly be observed for brewers that tend to produc

Anheuser-Busch, Coors, Pabst, Miller and Stroh.
Since graphical assessment is not very informative about t

predictive power of the models, summary statistics and performa

are analyzed next. The left part of Table IV presents summar

price increases (i.e., the absolute difference in prices betw

quarters).23 Except for full collusion, the mean and median
increases are similar across models and smaller than those of
increases; this is a consequence of most prices being under-p
closeness in statistics between single-product Bertrand-Nash
product Bertrand-Nash is consistent with the observation in

that a large portion of mark-ups may be explained by product dif

alone, and a small portion by brand ownership concentration.

23 Collusive price leadership is omitted from the table because convergence in
the predicted prices was not always achieved. When convergence was achieve
were unlikely high. The lack of convergence is interpreted as further support f
nature of this model.
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The summary statistics of Table IV would suggest that collusion among
3 firms appears to be a better predictor of actual price increases. However,
closer graphical inspection (discussed below) indicates that this is due to
larger over-predictions for Anheuser-Busch's and Miller brands rather than
by smaller under-predictions of other brands. Larger standard deviations of

predicted increases with respect to standard deviations of actual price
increases indicates less variability in actual price increases. The full collusion
model can confidently be rejected given its unlikely predicted increases.
The right part of Table IV presents three performance metrics. The first
metric (# Non-Rejections) is the number of brands for which predicted mean
price increases fall within the confidence intervals of actual mean price
increases shown in Figure 3. According to this metric, collusion among 3
brands explains firm conduct more precisely than the other models.
Two more rigorous metrics are considered. The first is the sum of weighted

price increases, where the weight is given by each brand's market share.

With this metric, accuracy in prediction is more important for more
widely sold brands. Interestingly, with this criterion Stackelberg leadership

by Anheuser-Busch, closely followed by Stackelberg leadership by
Budweiser, outperforms other models. The second metric is the sum of
squared deviations, where a deviation is defined as the difference between the
predicted increase and the actual increase.24 This criterion confirms that the
two Stackelberg models may be better predictors of actual conduct.

To further understand why the last two metrics indicate a superior

performance by Stackelberg leadership models, the differences between
predicted increases and actual increases for a selected group of brands and
models are analyzed. Figure 4 reports such differences for three models:

Bertrand-Nash, Stackelberg leadership by Anheuser-Busch and 3-firm
collusion. Stackelberg leadership by Budweiser and 3-brand collusion are
not included because they can not be distinguished visually from Anheuser

Busch Stackelberg leadership (A-B leads) and Bertrand-Nash (B-N),
respectively.25 The selected brands are those for which the notable
differences across models were observed; these brands belong to the three

largest firms (A-B, Coors, Miller).
Proximity to zero in Figure 4 denotes greater accuracy; a positive number

denotes over-prediction and a negative one under-prediction. Compared
with Bertrand-Nash, it can be seen that A-B Stackelberg is more accurate for
several A-B brands (both over-predicted and under-predicted), especially
Budweiser, the most popular brand in the U.S. The 3-firm collusion case
almost always predicts larger price increases than Bertrand-Nash and hence it
only represents an improvement to Bertrand-Nash in under-prediction cases.
24 The same conclusion is reached if each deviation is weighted.
25 Single-product Bertrand-Nash is also excluded because of its closeness to multi-product

Bertrand-Nash.
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*SeeTable B.I for Brand ID's

VII. CONCLUSION
The study combines a rich brand-level data set, recent demand estimation
techniques and a unique natural experiment (a large increase in excise tax) to
evaluate alternative models of firms' pricing conduct in the U.S. brewing
industry. The strategy is to focus on the period when the tax increase became

effective, January of 1991, and compare the observed prices with those
predicted by different models of price competition.

Bertrand-Nash, and several variants of leadership and collusion are

considered as possible pricing models. There are two cases of Stackelberg
leadership, one where the largest firm, Anheuser-Busch, leads with its entire

product line and another where it leads with its flagship brand Budweiser.
Collusive scenarios consider the three largest firms, the three leading regular

brands of beer and collusion among all brands. A case of collusive
leadership is also considered, where all brands match Budweiser's price
increases.

Several metrics of closeness between predicted price increases and
observed price increases indicate that collusion among all brands and
collusive price leadership can be confidently rejected as plausible models of
firm conduct. Among the remaining models, both Stackelberg leadership
variants appear to be slightly better predictors of firm behavior. However,
this evidence is interpreted with caution as competing models' predicted
increases are not largely dissimilar and it is likely that the better fit might not

be statistically significant to warrant such a conclusion. The results are
somewhat in line to those of Nevo [2001] and Slade [2004], who reject full
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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collusion in favor of Bertrand-Nash. Results also indicate that single
product Bertrand-Nash predicts price increases that are similar to those of
multi-product Bertrand-Nash, which suggests that mark-ups are mostly
driven by product differentiation while brand ownership concentration
appears to have a small role.

One possibility that emerges from this study is the existence of
observational equivalence between several models of competition.

The reason for this may be that in a complex environment with many
strategic interactions, it is more difficult to achieve straightforward
comparative static results than in the textbook duopoly case, where, for
example, Stackelberg's equilibrium price is substantially larger than
Bertrand-Nash's.

As in previous work, the inference conducted in this paper depends
crucially on the precision of demand estimates. The distance metric method
employed here is effective in reducing the number of cross-price and cross
price effects, but it relies heavily in the researcher's ability to have data on all

product characteristics that effectively determine substitution effects.
Results may change if there are important unobserved product character
istics.
There are several advantages and disadvantages to the approach used in
this paper. Since the effective change in marginal cost for all beer producers

is known, the comparison between models may be potentially more reliable
than contrasting crude measures of observed price-cost margins with the

implied price-cost margins. An additional advantage is the relative

simplicity with which comparisons across models can be made. However,

the approach employed here can not be generalized because

natural experiments are not always present. Another potential drawback
is that clear statistical comparisons, as in non-nested tests, may not be

feasible.

There are several issues that this study does not address. First, because of
the time aggregation of data (quarterly), it is not possible to study in more

detail firms' price adjustment decisions which would prove useful in
determining Anheuser-Buschs leadership and in analyzing the stock effects

of advertising. The analysis here takes the form of a one-shot game. A

dynamic environment, however, is important when future profits are not

independent of the current state thereby making the static solution
suboptimal. For example, it is likely that more successful firms like
Anheuser-Busch have a longer horizon in mind (and hence a potentially
different price than the static solution) than firms that are under financial

stress like Stroh, Heilman and Pabst. Finally, detailed cost data at the

manufacturer and retailer level can allow to extend the analysis to vertical
aspects and also more rigorous econometric tests of the competing pricing
models considered in this paper.
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial

Economics.

This content downloaded from 128.119.169.6 on Mon, 27 Feb 2017 20:43:51 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING 27

APPENDIX A: SUPPLY DETAILS

Derivation of^f
dpj
Define a partition of the product set as v|/ = (v|//, \|//), where \|//is the set of follower brands

and \|// is the set of leading brands, with /Fand JL number of elements respectively. For

each leader, a system of equations is constructed. Each Ith system of equations is used to

compute the vector of all ^ terms for leader /. An equation in system / is obtained by
totally differentiating the price first order condition of all follower brands (9)26 with
respect to all followers' prices (/?/, for all/e \|//) and the price of the Ith leader, /?/ (1 e \|//):

.fev, [dPf k V, V dpjdpfj ' ' d/>,J

(14) ' ^ " '

where Al takes the value of one if brandsy and

otherwise. Therefore, for a given leader /, th

(JF x JF) matrix that contains all g element

and Hi as:

- dPx i r -h(\,o ~

Ds= '. ;Hi =
.dpjF\ [-h(JFJ)_
For a given/?/, (14) is written in matrix notation as:

GDS - Hidpi = 0
where d/?/is treated as a scalar for matrix operations. The JF derivatives of the followers'

prices with respect to a given pt are computed as:

(15) ^ =dpiG~XHi
Concatenating the (?/ - JF) vectors of dimension (JF x 1) given in (15) (one vector for each

pi) gives D = GlH. The JF x JL matrix D has a typical element ^-, for/expand /e\|//.

26 It is assumed that the first order condition with respect to advertising (10) does not play a

role in deriving^. Without this assumption, inversion of matrix G below is not possible since it
is not a square matrix. Results are unlikely to be sensitive to this assumption given the estimated

small impact advertising has on demand.
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Marginal Costs in Leadership Models

Stackelberg Model

While marginal costs are obtained by applying (12), the derivative ^ needs to be

computed first via equation (15). Several technical difficulties arise in this model. First,
there is a large number of possible Stackelberg scenarios. Given the motivation in this
paper, only the case in which Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader, both with all its brands
as well as with Budweiser, are considered.

Second, since the term $f"Pj
in the leaders' first order conditions is a function of

followers' marginal costs (see equation (15)), these marginal costs are computed first.
When Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader with all its brands, followers' marginal costs can
be obtained by inversion of a smaller system of dimension JF in (12). These marginal
costs are used to compute %S which is afterwards used to calculate the marginal costs of
the leading brands.
When Budweiser is a sole brand leader, the term %*- is set to zero if m is produced by
Anheuser-Busch, except for the brand Budweiser. Also, it is assumed that Budweiser
only leads brands produced by rival firms (i.e., not by Anheuser-Busch).

Collusive Price Leadership Model
In this case, only Anheuser-Busch's marginal costs can be derived since first order
conditions of other firms are not relevant (see section IH(ii)). These marginal costs are
also recovered by applying (12) to a system of dimension JL (where JL is the number of

brands sold by Anheuser-Busch) and by setting ^ to 1 in Budweiser's first order

condition and zero in the remaining first order conditions.

APPENDIX B: DATA DETAILS
IRI is a Chicago based marketing firm that collects scanner data from a large sample of
supermarkets that is drawn from a universe of stores with annual sales of more than 2
million dollars. This universe accounts for 82% of all grocery sales in the U.S. In most
cities, the sample of supermarkets covers more than 20% of the relevant population. In
addition, IRI data correlates well with private sources in the Brewing Industry (the
correlation coefficient of market shares for the top 10 brands between data from IRI
and data from the Modern Brewery Age Blue Book is 0.95). Brands that had at least a
3% local market share in any given city were selected. After selecting brands according
to this criterion, remaining observations are dropped if they had a local market share of
less than 0.025%. Brands that appear in less than 10 quarters are also dropped. Also, if

a brand appears only in one city in a given quarter, the observation for that quarter is

not included either. This is done because some variables in other cities are used as

instruments. On average there are 37 brands sold in each city market with a minimum of
24 brands and a maximum of 48 brands. Table B.I contains a list of the brands used with

information on country of origin and the corresponding brewers.

The original data set contained observations in 63 cities; five cities were dropped
because of minimal number of brands or quantities. Overall, the number of cities
increases over time; however, some cities appear only in a few quarters in the middle of
? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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Table B.I
Selected Brands by Brewer (Acronym and Country of Origin)
Brewer Brand Brewer Brand

Anheuser-Busch: Budweiser Grupo Modelo: Corona
(AB, U.S.) Bud Dry (GM, Mexico)
Bud Light Goya (GO, U.S.): Goya

Busch Heineken: Heineken

Busch Light (H, Netherlands)

Michelob Labatt: Labatt

Michelob Dry (LB, Canada) Labatt Blue
Michelob Golden Draft Rolling Rock
Michelob Light Molson: Molson

Natural Light (M, Canada) Molson Golden

Adolph Coors: Coors Pabst: Falstaff

Odoufs Old Vienna

(ADC, U.S.) Coors Extra Gold (P, U.S.) Hamms

Coors Light Hamms Light
Keystone Olympia
Keystone Light Pabst Blue Ribbon

Bond Corpa: Black Label Red White & Blue

(B, U.S.) Blatz Miller/Phillip Morris: Genuine D

Heidelberg (PM, U.S.) Meister Brau
Henry Weinhard Ale Meister Brau Light

Henry Weinhard P. R. MGD Light

Kingsbury Miller High Life

Lone Star Miller Lite

Lone Star Light Milwaukee's Best
Old Style Stroh: Goebel
Old Style Light (S, U.S.) Old Milwaukee
Schmidts

Rainier Old Milwaukee Light

Piels

Sterling Schaefer

Weidemann Schlitz
White Stag Stroh

Genesee: Genesee FX Matts: M

(GE, U.S.) Kochs (W, U.S.) U

aThese brands correspond to G. Hieleman Brewi
Corporation Holdings; it is classified as a domest

the period. The average number of c
regional or national as follows. First t
present was averaged over time. Bra
denoted national and brands with a

regional. The variable WAGES was

interviewed individuals from the Bur
at the NBER. For a given city-quarter
sector were selected for that city over

then calculated over the number of in
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